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Machine learning (ML) based approach is considered as one of the most promising techniques for Android
malware detection and has achieved high accuracy by leveraging commonly-used features. In practice, most
of the ML classifications only provide a binary label to mobile users and app security analysts. However,
stakeholders are more interested in the reason why apps are classified as malicious in both academia and
industry. This belongs to the research area of interpretable ML but in a specific research domain (i.e., mobile
malware detection). Although several interpretable ML methods have been exhibited to explain the final
classification results in many cutting-edge Artificial Intelligent (AI) based research fields, till now, there is no
study interpreting why an app is classified as malware or unveiling the domain-specific challenges.
In this paper, to fill this gap, we propose a novel and interpretable ML-based approach (named XMal) to
classify malware with high accuracy and explain the classification result meanwhile. (1) The first classification
phase of XMal hinges multi-layer perceptron (MLP) and attention mechanism, and also pinpoints the key
features most related to the classification result. (2) The second interpreting phase aims at automatically
producing neural language descriptions to interpret the core malicious behaviors within apps. We evaluate
the behavior description results by leveraging a human study and an in-depth quantitative analysis. Moreover,
we further compare XMal with the existing interpretable ML-based methods (i.e., Drebin and LIME) to
demonstrate the effectiveness of XMal. We find that XMal is able to reveal the malicious behaviors more
accurately. Additionally, our experiments show that XMal can also interpret the reason why some samples
are misclassified by ML classifiers. Our study peeks into the interpretable ML through the research of Android
malware detection and analysis.
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2 Wu and Chen et al.
1 INTRODUCTION
Android malicious applications (malware) have become a serious security issue as the mobile
platform has become increasingly popular [1]. For example, more and more app users store per-
sonal data such as banking transactions on their mobile devices [14, 15], consequently, hackers
shift their attention on mobile devices and try to perform malicious behaviors through Android
apps. It is not surprising that a number of approaches have been proposed for detecting Android
malware. Specifically, traditional signature-based approaches [55, 74, 76] require frequent updates
of the signature database and fail to be effective in detecting emerging malware. Behavior-based
approaches [33, 57, 62, 68] also rely on the predefined malicious behaviors, which is limited by
the analysis of existing malicious samples. Data flow-based approaches [9, 32, 41] are usually
used to identify data leakage related malicious behaviors. Recently, researchers have proposed
many effective Android malware detection methods by using a plethora of machine learning (ML)
algorithms (e.g., KNN [6], SVM [7], Random Forest [52], and XGboost [28]) to classify and cate-
gorize malware. In these approaches, Android permissions and API calls are the commonly-used
feature types [7, 16, 18, 63], and achieved a high detection accuracy (more than 90%). Meanwhile,
researchers began to leverage deep neural networks like CNN and RNN (e.g., LSTM and GRU) to
detect Android malware [25–27, 37, 72] and promising performance has been achieved.
However, these ML-based methods only provide a binary label to mobile users and app security
analysts. In other words, these existing methods do not completely solve the problem of malware
detection because they merely mean that the classified apps are most likely Android malware
or benign apps. In practice, in many cases, only knowing the classification results is not enough.
For example, (1) the app store needs to know exactly what malicious behaviors the apps employ,
instead of classification results, in order to decide whether to remove them from markets. (2) For
app security analysts, they need to identify various malware and then understand the malicious
behaviors manually with substantial effort. It is a difficult and time-consuming task to analyze a
large-scale dataset of Android malware in the wild. However, the truth is that millions of malware
are classified and stored in the server. Therefore, interpreting and understanding what an ML model
has learned and how the model makes prediction can be as important as the detection accuracy
since it can guarantee the reliability of the classification model. Additionally, the robustness of
ML models is facing the security threat of adversarial samples according to a large number of
relevant research including Android malware [12, 16, 17, 19, 36, 39]. As ML-based methods are
black-box and cannot explain how they make predictions, adversaries might fool these methods by
constructing a little perturbation to misclassify malware as benign samples more smoothly.
In order to solve the problems mentioned above, we first investigated the approach of interpreting
malicious behaviors in Drebin [7] and found that the approach localized malicious behavior from
the trained model rather than the test sample itself. After that, we tried to explain the classification
of the malware detection using an interpretable ML method called LIME [53], but the feature results
are mismatched to the behavior because LIME did not consider the correlation between the input
features. To take the correlation between different features into account, we find that attention
mechanism has been applied in machine translation and computer vision (CV), and achieved great
success of interpretability [8, 30, 66, 73]. Therefore, we follow this research line, and propose a novel
and interpretable ML-based approach (named XMal) to detect Android malware and interpret
how predictions are made. XMal leverages a customized attention mechanism with a multi-layer
perceptron (MLP)model, which pinpoints the key features most related to the prediction result, since
the traditional attention mechanism cannot be used directly in Android malware detection scenario
(§2.3). Apart from the binary result, it also automatically generates a descriptive explanation (i.e., a
malicious behavior description) for the classification according to the key features. Additionally, it
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can help to explain why some benign apps are misclassified as malware and vice versa. We conduct
comprehensive experiments to demonstrate its interpretability of Android malware detection, and
the results show that XMal can detect Android malware effectively, with 98.35% accuracy, and can
identify the malicious behaviors that are validated by a human study through an online survey.
Our quantitative analysis can also be used to demonstrate the better performance on malware
description generation of XMal. In addition, we compare the results with the state-of-the-art
techniques in the interpretability of Android malware detection scenario. Finally, we present case
studies and in-depth discussion about our approach.
In summary, we make the main contributions as follows.
• We are the first work focusing on the interpretability of Android malware detection and
analysis. We concentrate on why an Android app is classified as malware rather than the
detection accuracy only.
• We propose XMal to interpret the malicious behaviors of Android malware, by leveraging a
customised attention mechanism with multi-layer perceptron (MLP).
• We conduct a human study by designing an online survey and a quantitative analysis to
validate the capability of XMal regarding interpretability, and also provide an in-depth
comparison study with the state-of-the-art techniques to demonstrate the effectiveness of
XMal.
• We present several case studies and an in-depth discussion to highlight the lessons learned
and the current status of interpretability of Android malware detection and analysis.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, firstly we review several potential solutions for interpretability in Android malware
detection and point out their weaknesses. Secondly, we introduce the attention mechanism as our
work uses the concept of attention mechanism. Finally, we highlight the motivation of our work.
2.1 Potential Solutions for Interpretability in Android Malware Detection
ML technique is widely used to classify the samples into different categories, however without
explaining the reason for the prediction results (i.e., not interpretable). interpretable, defined by
Doshi-Velez et al. [23], is the ability to explain or present the results in understandable terms to
human. In order to alleviate this problem, some general methods which are model-agnostic have
been proposed, such as LIME [53] and LEMNA [35]. On the other head, researchers have also
done some studies in areas of text categorization and image classification. For example, Arras et
al. [8] tried to demonstrate that understanding text categorization can be achieved by tracing the
classification decision back to individual words using layer-wise relevance propagation (LRP), a
recently developed technique for explaining predictions of complex non-linear classifiers. Zhou et
al. [73] proposed a new framework called Interpretable Basis Decomposition for providing visual
explanations for image classification networks. By decomposing the input image into semanti-
cally interpretable components, the proposed framework can quantify the contribution of each
component to the final prediction.
In Android malware detection and analysis, malware is identified by features (e.g., permissions,
intents, and API calls) extracted from the APK file. Usually, app analysts first extract dangerous
permissions and intents from AndroidManifest.xml. They utilize existing tools (e.g., dex2jar) to
decompile Dalvik executable (dex) files in the Android application package (apk) file to get the
source code and read the source code from the beginning to end to locate malicious code segments
that lead to malicious behaviors. Finally, they can identify malware through malicious behaviors,
which is very understandable to a human. In order to explain the predictions in ML, some key
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Fig. 1. Attention in machine translation
permissions, APIs, intents, or code segments should be used to match certain behaviors of Android
apps, which help us understand what behaviors the Android app might perform, causing it to be
classified as malware. Therefore, to explain why an app is classified as malware, we need to find
out which features have a significant impact on the classification in ML, and whether they are
indeed related to malicious behaviors of the malware. In order to do that, Drebin [7] utilized the
simple detection function of linear SVM to determine the contribution of each individual feature
to the classification result, which can be used to explain the classification of Android malware.
However, since Drebin actually outputs the features with the highest weights in the ML classifier,
rather than the test samples, the feature weights of different test samples are the same, which
may be inaccurate. Melis et al. [47] proposed to leverage a gradient-based approach to identify the
most influential local features. This method essentially obtains the gradient by approximating the
original complex model, and there is inevitably a bias. In summary, there is no specific study on
the interpretability of Android malware detection and analysis to interpret their corresponding
malicious behaviors so far.
2.2 Attention Mechanism
Attentionmechanism is a fairly popular concept and useful tool in the DL community in recent years
[61]. In deep learning (DL), it refers to paying more attention to certain factors when processing
data. It utilizes the attention vector to estimate howmuch an element is related to the target or other
elements, and take the sum of their values weighted by the attention vector as the approximation
of the target.
It was first proposed by Bahdanau et al. [10] to solve the problem of incapability of remembering
long source sentences in neural machine translation (NMT). An attention layer is embedded
between the encoder layer and the decoder layer, as shown in Fig. 1. The attention vector ci =
{ai,1,ai,2,ai,3,ai,4, ..,ai,n} has access to the entire input sequence, which guarantees the ability of
remembering long source sentences. More importantly, it also shows how significantly an input
element is related to the output target, and which input element is more important or has a higher
weight to generate the output.
Attention mechanism shows superiority in terms of classification and interpretability. It can help
the model assign different weights to each part of the input, extract more critical and important
information, making the model’s predictions more accurate, and make the prediction more under-
standable. For example, Xu et al. [65] proposed a method to explain why a certain word is output
by visualizing the attention weights of the image region. This is why the attention mechanism is
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Fig. 2. Overview of our approach (XMal)
so popular. In this paper, we make the first attempt to use and customize attention mechanism in
Android malware detection and analysis in order to interpret the prediction results.
2.3 Motivation of Our Work
In order to interpret the malware classification results, most existing interpretable ML-based meth-
ods utilize linear models or simple models (e.g., decision trees and linear regression) to approximate
the original complex model [53], because these models can simply show the weight of each feature
that contributes to the classification results. However, the usage of these models to approximate
the original complex model inevitably introduces deviations. Additionally, most of these methods
do not take into account the correlation between the input features. In fact, the features used by
Android malware detection are usually highly correlated such as SmsManager.sendTextMessage
and android.permission.SEND_SMS. This leads to the inability of these methods to give a correct
explanation for Android malware detection. In order to address these problems and challenges, we
propose a novel and effective method by using the attention mechanism with MLP for Android
malware detection. The attention mechanism estimates how strongly a feature is correlated with
other features and how important a feature is related to the prediction result. In Android malware
detection scenario, we try to customize the attention mechanism through a fully connected net-
work to learn the correlation between scalar-valued elements and assign corresponding weights
to elements, since the traditional attention mechanism is performed on elements in the form of
vectors and cannot be used directly in this case.
3 APPROACH
In this section, we first introduce the overview of our approach (named XMal), and then the details
of each component.
3.1 Overview
As shown in Fig. 2, our approach (XMal) consists of two main components (i.e., a Classifier and
an Interpreter). (1) The classifier component extracts API calls and used permissions from APK
files as inputs, and aims at accurately predicting whether an app is malware. The classifier can also
pinpoint the key input features most related to the prediction result. (2) The interpreter component
aims at automatically producing descriptions to interpret why an app is classified as malware. The
behavior descriptions are generated through the rule-based method according to the documentation
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collected from Android Developers [31]. The details of each component are elaborated in Section 3.2
and Section 3.3, respectively.
3.2 Classifier Component
In this section, we introduce how to extract the key features that have more relevance to the
classification results. The key feature extraction conducts two processes: feature extraction and
model training. We detail the two processes as below.
3.2.1 Feature Extraction. Usually, if an Android app exhibits malicious behaviors, it will be granted
with the necessary permissions and call the corresponding APIs. In fact, permission and API
calls are the top two important and commonly-used feature types for Android malware detection
and analysis [50]. A lot of studies used these two features as significant features for classifying
Android malware, such as Drebin [7], DriodAPIMiner [6], DroidMat [63] and many other previous
studies [16, 18, 28, 37, 46, 67, 70, 72]. Additionally, they contain semantics that can be used to help
to understand the behaviors of the application. Therefore, in this paper, we follow the common
practice and use API calls and permissions as the features to train a malware classifier. In Android
system, there are hundreds of permissions, and the number of APIs exceeds 20,000. But not all
of them are helpful in distinguishing malware. Li et al. [40] utilized three levels of pruning and
found that only 22 permissions are significant for detecting malware. Therefore, we need to employ
pruning to preserve those features that can be used to identify malware efficiently. Here we
refer to the paper [16] and select 158 features (including 97 API calls and 61 permissions) for
our study by using manual statistical pruning method in [16] from the original 2,114 features
extracted from the training sample set. The selected features have a high degree of discrimination
for malware classification, which is good for improving the accuracy and interpretability of the
classification. Meanwhile, since API calls and permissions have more semantics that enable people
to understand their role in the applications, using them as the features can help further interpret
our model. Additionally, our approach is general that can be extended the new feature categories
to capture more complex malicious behaviors according to new malware samples. In order to
extract API calls and permissions, we utilize Androguard [22] to extract API calls and permissions
from APK file, which are used to construct the feature vector. Here we denote a sample set
by {{(xi ,yi )}|xi ∈ X ,yi ∈ Y , 1 <= i <= M}, where X is the set of xi and Y is the set of yi ,
xi = (x (1)i ,x (2)i ,x (3)i , ...,x (N )i ) is the feature vector of the i-th sample, N is the total number of
features, yi ∈ {0, 1} is the label of the i-th sample (i.e., 0 for benign, 1 for malicious), andM is the
total number of samples. x (j)i represents the j-th feature of the i-th sample. If the j-th feature exists
in the i-th sample, then x (j)i = 1, otherwise, x
(j)
i = 0.
3.2.2 Customized Classification Model and Model Training. After extracting features and construct-
ing a feature vector, we feed the feature vector to train the malware classifier. As shown in Fig. 2,
the classifier consists of two layers: the attention layer and the multi-layer perceptron (MLP). The
attention layer is designed to learn weights of the features which can be regarded as relevancy
scores between the features and classification results. Then the MLP maps the features weighted
by the attention layer to the binary classification.
The traditional attention mechanism is to obtain the weight of the input feature by scoring how
well the input feature and the output match, which can be formulated as follows:
ei j = score(si−1,hj), (1)
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Fig. 3. Attention layer in XMal
where si−1 is hidden state of output, and hj is the j-th annotation of input. Then the feature
weight can be computed by:
αi j =
exp(ei j )∑n
k=1 exp(eik )
. (2)
The score function will be different according to different scenarios. For instance, the score function
in the paper by Luon et al. [45] is computed by:
score(si−1,hj) = sTi−1hj , (3)
The input feature of traditional attention mechanism is generally expressed as a vector. But the
features extracted from the samples are composed of scalar values. They can not be used to compute
the score like Equation 3. Here we customize a fully connected network and a softmax function to
implement the attention layer, as shown in Fig. 3. Because a fully connected network can capture
the correlations between scalar-valued input features.
We compute how well all input features and the output at j-th position match by:
e(j)i =
N∑
k=1
x (k )i wk j , (4)
wherewk j is a learnable parameters of the fully connected network in attention layer. e(j)i as the
output at j-th position in the fully connected network, is a linear combination of all input features
x (k )i . It can be regarded as the combination of a set of features that have different relevance to
the input feature at j-th position. After the model training, the parameterwk j will be assigned an
appropriate value to show the correlation between the input feature at j-th position and other input
features. Therefore, our customized attention layer has considered the correlation between the
input features when computing the weight of input features.
Here we perform a softmax function on the output of the fully connected network to obtain
the weights of input features at different positions. We denote attention vector by αi , where αi =
(α (1)i ,α (2)i ,α (1)i , ...,α (n)i ). α (j)i represents the weight of j-th feature in i-th sample, and is computed
by:
α (j)i =
exp(e(j)i )∑N
k=1 exp(e(k )i )
, (5)
where α (j)i reflects the importance of the input feature at i-th position in deciding classification
results.
After generating the attention vector through the attention layer, the MLP is used to map the
features weighted by the attention vector to the binary classification. Here we denote the weighted
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feature vector of the i-th sample by ci . It is obtained by weighting the input feature vector using
the attention vector, and is computed by:
ci = αix
T
i . (6)
In the end, the classification result can be computed by:
yi = f (ci ), (7)
where f (·) represents the function of MLP that maps the input vector ci into a binary prediction
result.
When the training data are fed to train the classifier, the attention layer assigns different weights
to the corresponding features based on their relevance to the classification result. Features that have
more relevance to classification are assigned larger weights, while features with less impact are
assigned smaller weights. Other interpretable ML methods aim to obtain the weight of the feature
by approximating the original complex model. Unlike them, XMal directly obtains the weight of
the feature by embedding the attention layer in the model, therefore there is no deviation. After
feature extraction and model training, a malware classifier is generated. When a sample is input
into the classifier, the classification result and a list of features with different weights are obtained.
We remove those features that do not exist in the sample and sort the left features according to
their weights. Then we select the top n features to generate the behavior description. Here, n is a
hyperparameter. It is important to select a proper number for n. Although choosing more features
as key features may help to identify more malicious behaviors, too many features will reduce the
interpretability of classification [53]. The number for n is a heuristic value depending on concrete
scenarios. According to the experiments, the default value is configured as 6.
Our customized model utilizes a fully connected network in the attention layer to capture the
correlation between features, rather than a multi-layer fully connected network. A multi-layer
fully connected network may capture much more complex relationships between features, but it
is also difficult to understand and interpret since it involves too many mathematical operations,
making it impossible for humans to follow the exact mapping from input feature to output. That
is one reason why we do not use CNN or RNN models. In general, the deep learning models still
cannot be interpreted accurately. How to interpret deep neural networks is an open challenge so
far, which also belongs to our future work.
3.3 Malware Description Generation
In order to generate malicious behavior description for Android malware, we first match the
malware key features to their corresponding semantics. We select a 158-dimensional feature
vector as input to train the classifiers. We search Android developer documentation [31] for the
semantics of each feature according to its name. The Android developer documentation has a
detailed functional description for each API and permission. We download the detailed functional
description of each feature. However, the functional descriptions include too many details and are
difficult to understand comprehensively. We simplify and generalize them into simple semantics
by intercepting and generalizing the key predicates, objects, and complements. For example, the
functional description of READ_CONTACTS is “Allows an application to read the user’s contacts
data”. We generalize it as “Collect contacts”. Similarly, permission.READ_CONTACTS is generalized
as “Collect contacts”. After that, we use the feature and the corresponding semantic to build a
semantic database (shown in Fig. 4). According to our observation, some features share the same
semantics. For instance, URL.openconnection andURLConnection.connect share the same semantics
of “Access the Internet”. Besides, some features exhibit a similar functionality and can be combined
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Fig. 4. Malware description generation
into one semantic feature. For example, permission.READ_CONTACTS and permission.READ_SMS
are both about information collection and can be combined into “Collect contact/SMS”. Therefore,
we denote two rules as follows:
• Rule 1: If features belong to a same functionality, they are assigned the same semantics.
• Rule 2: If features exhibit a similar functionality, they are assigned the similar semantics and
the two similar semantics are combined into one.
In this way, we match features with semantics based on their functional descriptions so as
to obtain simple and useful semantics for features. After that, we convert the semantics into
malware descriptions to make it easier for users to understand. In order to generate reasonable
descriptions for the Android malware, we summarize ten basic malicious behaviors from a large
number of malware, and establish the mapping relation between the malicious behaviors and their
corresponding semantics. We also define some ordering rules to arrange the semantics (shown
in Fig. 4, ordering rule) according to the malware behavior analysis by manual (shown in Fig. 4,
malware behavior analysis). For example, if “activated by BOOT” exists, it should be ranked first;
If “access the internet”and “collect IMEI” exist at the same time, “collect IMEI” should be in front
of “Access the internet”. Therefore, when “access to the Internet", “collect IMEI” and “Activate by
BOOT” exist simultaneously, the order should be “activated by BOOT”, “collect IMEI” and “access
the Internet”. Then they are converted into “Launch with system startup, collect info on the device,
and send it to remote server over the Internet” through the mapping relation between semantics
and malware behaviors.
Specifically, we first get a set of key features U , where ki ∈ U is the i-th key feature. Then
we converted ki into si one by one in the phase1 shown in Fig. 4, where si is the i-th semantics.
According to Rule 1, if key features belong to a same functionality, they are assigned to the same
semantics. Therefore, those semantics that exist in S are not added to S again. According to Rule 2,
if the key features exhibit a similar functionality, their similar semantics are combined into one.
Therefore, when the semantics si similar to semantic s in S appears, we combine it with s and then
update s in S . After that, we convert the semantics into descriptions one by one in the phase2 shown
in Fig. 4. Fig. 4 shows how the interpreter generates the malware description step by step and how
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the semantic database and ordering rule are established. The implementation details of the semantic
database and ordering rules are provided on our website: https://sites.google.com/view/xmal/.
4 EVALUATION
In this paper, we aim to utilize the proposed method XMal to explain why an app is classified
as malware. However, before interpreting the classification results, we should ensure that the
detection accuracy is high enough since the malware detection accuracy is as important as the
interpretability results, otherwise, the interpretation is meaningless. Therefore, in this section,
we perform experiments to evaluate the malware detection accuracy and interpretability of the
proposed method. Additionally, we also conduct an in-depth comparison study between XMal
and the state-of-the-art techniques. We aim to answer the following research questions in our
evaluation.
4.1 RQ1: What is the detection accuracy of XMal in the malware classification?
In this experiment, we first investigate the Android malware detection performance of XMal. We
adapt the best hyperparameters of XMal for the best detection performance, and then conduct
experiments to evaluate XMal and compare it with the state-of-the-art techniques. Finally, we
investigate whether XMal can further be extended to the unsupervised Android applications in
the wild.
4.1.1 Dataset. To conduct the experiment, we first collect a large amount of Android malware from
two sources: 10,010 samples from the National Internet Emergency Center [2] and 5,560 samples
from Drebin [7]. Most of the samples from the National Internet Emergency Center are the recent
malicious samples rather than from old datasets such as Gemome [75] in 2011. These malware
samples include a variety of threats for Android, such as data leakage, phishing, trojans, spyware,
and root exploits. Apart from these malicious apps, we also fetched the top apps overall per category
from Google Play Store and HUAWEI app store on July 2019 and collect 20,193 apps in total. We
removed the ones that are classified as Android malware candidates by VirusTotal service [5].
Finally, we obtain 20,120 benign samples in total and 15,570 malicious samples, which are available
on our website https://sites.google.com/view/xmal/.
4.1.2 Setup. To select the best hyperparameters for XMal, we first randomly split the 15,570
Android malware samples and 20,120 benign apps into a training set (70%, i.e., 24,983 samples in
total) and a test set (30%, i.e., 10,707 samples in total). Note that these two sets have no overlap in
our experiments. After that, we extract 158-dimensional feature vectors including 97 API calls and
61 permissions from the training set to train XMal, and utilize test set to evaluate the detection
accuracy of XMal. Then we test different hyperparameters to XMal and finally determine the
hyperparameters that can achieve the best detection performance.
In order to further demonstrate the superiority of XMal, we compare it with the state-of-the-art
techniques and use recall, precision, accuracy, and F-measure to evaluate the detection performance.
In this experiment, we compare XMal with Drebin [7] and LIME [53]. The reasons we select
these two methods are as follows: 1) Drebin is a model-specific interpretable method like XMal,
and achieve a high Android malware detection accuracy of 93.90%. 2) LIME proposes an effective
model-agnostic method to interpret individual model prediction and obtain a high classification
accuracy. It is one of the most valuable methods in model interpretability and has been cited and
compared by many related research studies [35, 44, 48, 49, 54]. Comparing XMal with LIME is very
significant for evaluating the interpretability and detection accuracy of XMal.
In conducting a comparison experiment, we first re-implement Drebin based on its published
research paper. Since LIME is open-source, we are able to reuse it directly for our experiments.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: September 2020.
Why an Android App is Classified as Malware? Towards Malware Classification Interpretation 11
0.9832 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
F
-M
E
A
S
U
R
E
(a) Optimizer & Activation
0.9838 
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
F
-M
E
A
S
U
R
E
(b) Epochs & Batch_size
Fig. 5. Detection precision and recall under the different hyperparameters
Table 1. Detection results of three models
Models Drebin MLP in LIME XMal
Recall 94.90% 97.13% 98.28%
Precision 95.94% 96.38% 98.48%
Accuracy 95.24% 96.50% 98.35%
F-measure 95.42% 96.75% 98.37%
Specifically, for Drebin, we extract 422-dimensional features including API, permission, intent,
activity, service, and hardware components from the dataset, and utilize them to train and test the
model in Drebin. For LIME, since it is a model-agnostic method, we apply it to the MLP model. We
extract the same features as XMal from the data set mentioned in the accuracy experiment to train
and test the MLP model.
Moreover, to evaluate the detection accuracy of XMal in different malware families, we also
select the top 16 malware families with the largest number of samples (cf. Table 2) according to the
malware family tags provided by Drebin [7]. Since some malware families have too few samples to
validate the interpretable results in the next experiments, we randomly select 10 samples for each
malware family (i.e., 160 samples in total) from the test set for further investigation. In addition, in
order to validate the detection accuracy of XMal in the samples from National Internet Emergency
Center, we also randomly select 10 malicious samples from the test set. Finally, 170 malicious
samples are selected to test and compare, we also randomly select 170 benign apps from the test
set accordingly to validate XMal.
Parameter tuning for best classification performance. To achieve a better detection perfor-
mance, we first search for the best hyperparameters (i.e., learning rate, optimizer, activation function,
epochs, and batch_size) of XMal. Specifically, we set the learning rate to a set of values including
0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, and 0.1, which shows a little difference in detection performance. Therefore, we
select 0.001 as the learning rate in our experiments. Fig. 5(a) demonstrates the detection results of
applying different optimizer and activation function. As a result, “adam + softmax” achieves the
best performance overall. We further investigate the impact of epochs and batch_size. As shown in
Fig. 5(b), the configuration of 10 epochs and 20 batch_size achieves the best result.
4.1.3 Results. After determining the best hyperparameters of XMal, we use the test set (10,707
samples in total) to test XMal, Drebin, and LIME, and compare their detection performance. The
experiment results are shown in Table 1. The result shows that the accuracy of the re-implemented
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Table 2. Detection accuracy of the top 16 malware families
Families TPR Families TPR Families TPR Families TPR
Adrd 100% DroidKungFu 80% BaseBridge 100% Geinimi 100%
DroidDream 100% GinMaster 100% SendPay 100% Iconosys 100%
FakeDoc 100% Gappusin 100% Plankton 100% Kmin 100%
FakeInstaller 100% MobileTx 100% SMSreg 90% Opfake 100%
model of Drebin is 95.24%, while the original accuracy in the paper is 93.90%, indicating the
model we implemented is comparable to the original model. Note that, the accuracy of the re-
implemented model is better than the original model because we perform the feature selection by
using manual statistical pruning used in [16]. The accuracy of the three models are all above 95%,
while XMal achieves 98.35% detection accuracy, outperforms the other two methods. Moreover,
we evaluate XMal on the 170 benign test sample with a TNR (true negative rate) of 98.82%, which
means that only 2 benign applications are misclassified as malware. We also test XMal on the 170
malware samples. The TPR (true positive rate) of the 10 malware samples from National Internet
Emergency Center is 100%, and the TPR of each family is shown in Table 3. We can see that most
malware families have a TPR of 100%, while DroidKungFu and SMSreg have TPRs of 80% and
90%, respectively, which means only two DroidKungFu malware and one SMSreg malware are
misclassified as benign. In summary, XMal achieves high detection accuracy in malware detection.
In order to validate XMal on unsupervised cases, we also randomly collect 1,000 Android apps
from several Android application markets (e.g., Google Play Store, APKpure, coolapk, appchina, and
mi.com) and employ XMal on these samples. We find that five of them are classified as malware.
After manual analysis, we confirm that three apps1 privately obtain the users’ contacts and send
them to a malicious remote server. Now they have been removed from the app stores. The other
two apps2 trick users into downloading apps and collect users’ information. They still can be found
on the website http://www.appchina.com/soft and we will report accordingly.
4.2 RQ2: How well does the malware description generated by XMalmatch the actual
malicious behaviors of the malware?
We aim to interpret why an app is classified as malware in this section. To answer it, we conduct
experiments to investigate whether the malware descriptions can match the actual malicious
behavior of the malware.
4.2.1 Dataset. We perform interpretability experiments on all malicious samples (15,570 in total
collected in Section 4.1.1) and generate the corresponding malware descriptions for each of them.
In order to evaluate whether the malware descriptions generated by XMal match the actual
malicious behaviors of the malware, we use the 170 malicious samples mentioned in Section 4.1.2
to establish the ground truth. Among them, since the 10 malware samples from National Internet
Emergency Center have been analyzed before and the corresponding expert analysis has been
validated by the expert team, we directly employ them as the ground truth of malware description.
Note that, all members of the expert team are from National Internet Emergency Center and have
engaged in malware analysis on the platform of Android and Windows for more than 3 years. They
1SHA1 values: 7BA69225D0B9B06DCADACA693DF58DE03228CDBE, AEDCB0B03C9193AC1F4B9CCFB31DDBA0FB7D9510,
and AA0A1B157EA57E753C793F68141155A5A72F0620
2SHA1 values: 4246c467eb833805a0e7c09df0e8d72cf182bdfa and 8075a71fd8165fd1e33652fd7cd55f06b09a1697
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perform malware analysis and computer forensics on a daily basis, and are good at analyzing the
malicious code/behaviors and identifying malware manually. For the other 160 samples from the
top 16 malware families, we collect the corresponding expert analysis reports of each family from
Symantec [4] and Microsoft [3]. Meanwhile, we collaborate with the experienced expert team from
National Internet Emergency Center, where they manually analyze these malware samples and
provide the corresponding analysis reports. After that, we cross-validate the analysis reports from
the two different resources and obtain the final ground truth of malware descriptions. Consequently,
we can evaluate the interpretability results by comparing with the ground truth.
In addition, to further evaluate whether XMal can explain why the benign application is mis-
classified as malicious, we also select the 170 benign apps mentioned in Section 4.1.2 to conduct
the experiments.
4.2.2 Setup. We first use XMal to generate the malicious behavior descriptions of the 15,570
malicious samples and evaluate if the generated descriptions (170 malware samples) match with
the ground truth. In addition, to further evaluate whether XMal can explain why the benign
application is misclassified as malicious, we employ XMal on the 170 benign samples to conduct
more experiments. However, the evaluation may be biased by our subjective opinions. In order to
mitigate this problem, we randomly select one sample from each malware family and conduct an
online survey to investigate the quality of the malware description generated for these samples.
Moreover, we also conduct a quantitative analysis to validate the effectiveness of XMal.
Evaluation Metrics. The ground truth and generated malware descriptions by XMal are unstruc-
tured text, which cannot be compared quantitatively. Inspired by Grounded Theory [21, 56], we
extract “concepts” from the ground truth and generate malware descriptions, and compute how
many “concepts” in the ground truth can be detected by XMal and how many “concepts” in the
generated descriptions do not exist in the ground truth. Here, “concept” refers to a meta-behavior.
For instance, “Activate when the mobile device is booted up” consists of two “concepts”, “Activate”
and “the mobile device is booted up”. Here, we let total_concepts be the total number of “concepts” in
the ground truth, detect_concepts be the number of “concepts” in the ground truth that are detected
by XMal, and surplus_concepts be the number of “concepts” in the generated descriptions that do
not exist in the ground truth. In order to quantitatively measure the interpretability results, we
define the evaluation metric “interpretability result” (a.k.a. ir) as follows, and use ir to evaluate the
generated descriptions of all malware by XMal.
precision =
detect_concepts
detect_concepts + surplus_concept (8)
recall =
detect_concepts
total_concepts (9)
ir =
2 × precision × recall
precision + recall
(10)
As the number of detect_concepts increases, ir becomes larger.When the number of surplus_concepts
increases, ir becomes smaller. Therefore, the closer ir is to 1, the better the interpretability result. We
take the Adrd in Table 5 as an example to illustrate the calculation process of ir. We extract concepts
from the ground truth and the generated description and list them in Table 3. Specifically, “activate”
vs. “launch” are the same concept. Similarly, “the mobile device is booted up” vs. “system startup”,
“access the Internet” vs. “over the Internet”, “stead some info” vs. “collect info on the device”, and
“send to remote server” vs. “send it to remote server” are also the same concept. Consequently, we
can know that detect_concepts is 5, surplus_concepts is 0, and total_concepts is 6. So ir is 0.91.
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Table 3. The “Concepts” of Adrd
Concepts
Ground Truth 1. activate 2. the mobile device is booted up 3. access the Internet4. download components 5. stead some info 6. send to remote server
Generated Description 1. launch 2. system startup 3. collect info on the device4. send it to remote server 5. over the internet
Table 4. The ir computed by different values of n
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ir 0.45 0.67 0.68 0.75 0.87 0.92 0.72 0.69 0.62 0.58
Parameter tuning for best interpretability. Before conducting the experiments, we perform
hyperparameter tuning to select a proper value for n. We first obtain 50 malware samples and the
corresponding expert analysis reports from National Internet Emergency Center. Then, we evaluate
XMal and calculate ir of all samples under different values of n (i.e., ranging from 1 to 10). The
results are shown in Table 4. We find that when n is set to 6, the average of ir for all samples is
closest to 1, which is 0.92. Therefore, in the following experiments, n is set to 6. Note that 6 is not
the best number of features in all scenarios. Hyperparameter tunning is necessary for different
scenarios.
4.2.3 Results. We select one sample from eachmalware family and two samples (named “blackgame”
and “xunbaikew1”) from National Internet Emergency Center to demonstrate the interpretability
of XMal. The interpretability results are as shown in Table 5. To illustrate how the experimental
results explain why an app is classified as malware, we take Adrd and Opfake families as examples.
Android.Adrd is a Trojan horse in Adrd malware family that steals information from An-
droid devices. As shown in Table 5, XMal outputs 6 key features (i.e., URL.openConnection,
READ_PHONE_STATE, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, requestLocationUpdates, getResponseC-
ode, and getSubscriberId) for a sample of Adrd, and generates the corresponding semantics (i.e.,
“Access the Internet”, “Collect IMEI/IMSI/location”, and “Activate by BOOT”) and malicious behavior
description (i.e, “Launch with system startup, collect info on the device, and send it to remote server
over the internet” ). The malicious behavior description generated by XMal can clearly explain the
reason why the sample of Adrd is classified as malware. In addition, the expert analysis of Adrd in
Table 5 shows that it has the behavior of re-executing itself when the mobile device is booted up,
stealing information and sending to a remote server. This is consistent with the malicious behavior
description generated by XMal, which demonstrates the effectiveness of XMal. Additionally, we
cross-validate through three co-authors to determine whether the semantics of the generated
description by XMal is consistent with the ground truth (i.e., Expert Analysis). We accept the result
only if all of us agree on it.
Opfake family sends SMS messages to premium-rate numbers on the Android platform. As
can be seen from Table 5, XMal outputs four key feature (i.e., SEND_SMS, openConnection,
READ_PHONE_STATE, and getNetworkOperator) for a sample of Opfake, and generates the
corresponding semantics (i.e., “Send SMS messages”, “Access the Internet”, and “Collect IMEI”) and
malicious behavior description (i.e., “Send SMS to premium-rate numbers, collect info on the device,
and send it to a remote server over the internet”). The malicious behavior description generated by
XMal is also consistent with the expert analysis of Opfake shown in Table 5, which also accurately
explains why the sample in Opfake is classified as malware.
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Table 5. Part of the Interpretability Results of XMal. The full list can be found on our website https://sites.
google.com/view/xmal/
Key Features Semantics Matching Description Generated by XMal Expert Analysis (Ground Truth)
Ad
rd
URL.openConnection
READ_PHONE_STATE
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
LocationManager.requestLocationUpdates
HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode
TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId
1. Access the Internet
2. Collect IMEI/IMSI/location
3. Activated by BOOT
Launch with system startup,
collect info on the device,
and send it to remote server
over the internet
1. Activate when the mobile
device is booted up.
2. Access the Internet and
download components
3. Steal some info and send to
remote server.
Ba
se
Br
id
ge
SEND_SMS
URL.openConnection
READ_PHONE_STATE
RECEIVE_SMS
URLConnection.connect
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
1. Send SMS messages
2. Access the Internet
3. Collect IMEI/SMS
4. Activated by BOOT
Launch with system startup,
send SMS to premium-rate
numbers, collect info on the
device, and send it to remote
server over the internet
1. Send and receive SMS
2. Info is sent to remote server:
a) Subscriber ID
b) Device manufacturer/model
c) Android OS version
3. Activate when the mobile starts
D
ro
id
Ku
ng
Fu
URL.openConnection
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
READ_PHONE_STATE
URLConnection.getURL
URLConnection.connect
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
1. Access the Internet
2. Write to external storage
3. Collect IMEI
4. Activated by BOOT
Launch with system startup,
download malware to SD card,
collect info on the device,
and send it to remote server
over the internet
1. Steal sensitive info:
IMEI number, device version,
operating system version, etc.
2. Download files from remote
computer or the internet.
Fa
ke
In
st
al
le
r SEND_SMS
READ_PHONE_STATE
RECEIVE_SMS
READ_SMS
TelephonyManager.getNetworkOperator
WAKE_LOCK
1. Send SMS messages
2. Collect IMEI/SMS
3. Unlock phone
Send SMS to premium-rate
numbers, collect info on the
device, keep running in the
background
1. Send the premium SMS
2. Receive commands from
a remote server
Ga
pp
us
in URL.openConnection
READ_PHONE_STATE
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
NotificationManager.notify
1. Access the Internet
2. Collect IMEI
3. Activated by BOOT
4. Notify the info
Launch with system startup,
collect info on the device,
and send it to remote server
over the Internet, send a
notification as system
1. Post device info such as
IMEI, IMSI, and OS version.
2. Download apps/disguises
as system updates.
O
pf
ak
e SEND_SMS
URL.openConnection
READ_PHONE_STATE
TelephonyManager.getNetworkOperator
1. Send SMS messages
2. Access the Internet
3. Collect IMEI
Send SMS to premium-rate
numbers, collect info on the
device, and send it to remote
server over the Internet
1. Send SMS to premium-rate num.
2. Access info about network.
3. Check the phone’s current state.
bl
ac
kg
am
e
URL.openConnection
SEND_SMS
RECEIVE_SMS
WRITE_SMS
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId
1. Access the Internet
2. Send SMS messages
3. Collect SMS/IMEI/IMSI
Send SMS to premium-rate
numbers, collect info on the
device, and send it to remote
server over the internet
1. Send SMS to premium-rate num.
2. obtain phone num and device info
and upload it to the remote server.
xu
nb
ai
ke
w
1
SEND_SMS
ContentResolver.query
READ_CONTACTS
1. Send SMS messages
2. Collect contact info
Collect contact info on the
device, and send SMS to
premium-rate num
Collect contact info, and then send
SMS with the app download link
to all contacts.
Table 6. Two misclassified benign apps
Sample Key Features Semantics Matching
HiViewTunnel
permission.INTERNET
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
URL.openConnection
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
1. Access the Internet
2. Write to external storage
3. Collect DeviceId
HwSpaceService
permission.INTERNET
URL.openConnection
WAKE_LOCK
ContentResolver.query
READ_PHONE_STATE
1. Access the Internet
2. Unlock phone
3. Collect SMS/IMEI
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In addition to the two examples above, the malicious behavior descriptions of the other samples
alsomatch the expert analysis as shown in Table 5.XMal provides a fairly reasonable explanation for
the classification results. However, there are also some exceptions, such as a sample of FakeInstaller
shown in Table 5. The malicious behavior description generated by XMal includes the behavior
of sending SMS to premium-rate numbers, collecting information on the device, and keeping
running in the background, however, the expert analysis only includes the behavior of sending
the premium SMS. After manual analysis, we find that this sample indeed has the behavior of
collecting information and keeping running in the background. Another sample is “xunbaikew1”,
which collects contact information and sends SMS message with the app download link to all
contacts. XMal captures the malicious behavior of collecting contact information but misses the
behavior of sending SMS message as sending SMS to a premium-rate number. Actually, some key
features such as SEND_SMS can be mapped to different malicious behaviors in different scenarios
like sending SMS with malicious download links. XMal may not be able to cover all the malicious
behaviors only by mapping the key features. It can be improved by adding more other information
from apps. Based on the expert analysis of the top 16 malware families, we find that 13 malware
families (except FakeInstaller, FakeDoc, and SendPay) have the behavior of stealing information
and sending it to a remote server over the internet, and 7 malware families have the behavior of
sending SMS messages. Moreover, some of the information stolen by malware families is the same
(e.g., IMEI, OS version, and device ID). We can conclude that the APIs and permissions used to
perform malicious behaviors between different malware families are similar in Drebin dataset,
which is consistent with our experimental results.
As aforementioned in Section 4.1.3, two benign apps are misclassified as malware and three
malware samples are misclassified as benign. We attempt to analyze why they are misclassified
according to the interpretable results of XMal. The two benign applications that are misclassified
are HiViewTunnel and HwSpaceService, which are internal system applications for the HUAWEI
phone. We can see in Table 6 that the two apps do use some suspicious permissions and APIs,
causing them being classified as malware. In fact, they are just built-in system apps that use sensitive
APIs and permissions. In this case, it is difficult for XMal to correctly distinguish malware, as
the built-in system apps have the same features and behaviors as malware. For the three malware
samples that are misclassified, XMal outputs no key features for all of them, which means that
XMal does not identify any key features of these samples to classify them as malware, resulting in
malicious samples being misclassified as benign. We further manually analyze these three samples
and find that the malware APK file in SMSreg lacks the configuration file, AndroidManifest.xml,
resulting in that the app has no permission to perform malicious behaviors so as to be identified
as benign. The remaining two samples hide malicious behavior in the .so file and the asset folder,
causing their malicious behaviors to be unrecognizable because XMal does not analyze the .so
files and the files in the asset folder.
4.2.4 Online Survey. In order to alleviate the bias caused by subjective opinions, we conduct an
online survey to investigate the respondents’ evaluation of the interpretable results (i.e., malware
description) generated by XMal.
Dataset. We randomly select one sample from each malware family and use the corresponding
interpretability results of these malware to design the survey.
Participant Recruitment.We recruit 33 people from industrial companies and our universities to
participate in the experiments via emails and word-of-mouth. Among the participants, 60.6% come
from industry, and the rest come from academia. Note that, 6 security analysts from the National
Internet Emergency Center also corroborate with us and help to accomplish this online survey. They
come from different countries, such as USA, UK, Germany, China, Singapore, and Australia. They
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Fig. 6. Country and occupation distribution of participants
have a variety of occupations, ranging from PhD students, post-doctoral researchers, and professors.
Fig. 6 shows the country and occupation distribution of participants. Their expertise includes app
developers, computer security professionals, and machine learning researchers. Among them, 20
participants have experience in malware classification, while 17 respondents have more than 1 year
of Android malware classification experience.
Experiment Procedures.We start the online survey with a brief introduction. We explain to the
participants that our task is to evaluate how well the generated malware description results match
the ground truth. Then the participants are required to provide their personal information relevant
to the survey. In order to quantitatively measure the quality of the generated results, we define the
rating scale as 1 to 5 where a higher score means that the generated results match the ground truth
better. The participants are required to rate the quality of the generated results by comparing them
with the ground truth of a total of 16 malware samples from 16 malware families.
There are two main tasks that participants are required to complete. Participants need to (1) fill
in their personal information in the survey, such as name, country, academia or industry, field of
work, the role at work, and their experience in Android malware classification, etc., and to (2) click
the corresponding button in the survey to rate the generated malware descriptions of each sample
by comparing them with the ground truth. The online survey contains 26 questions in total and
takes about 20 minutes to complete. Table 7 demonstrates a part of the questions in the survey. The
survey is available on https://forms.gle/RFUmPaSE9eKfG9zm8.
Survey Results. To ensure the quality of the survey result, we excluded those surveys that take
less than 5 minutes to complete, and finally obtained 30 valid survey results. The average score of
each sample is shown in Fig. 7. The average score of Kmin is 4, which means that the generated
result of Kmin is good. Except for Gappusin, all other sampled scores are more than 3, which means
Table 7. Part of the questions in the survey
Questions Rating Scale (Score: 1-5)
Part2
Q1: score the following generated description of “Adrd0”.
Ground Truth:
1. Activate when the mobile device is booted up.
2. Access the Internet and download componets
3. Steal the following info and send to a remote server.
Generated Result:
Launch with system startup, collect info on the device
and send it to remote server over the internet.
Q2: score the following generated description of “BaseBridge0”
......
1: Poor
2: Marginal
3: Acceptable
4: Good
5: Excellent
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that the generated description results are acceptable. All in all, the average score of all samples is 3.7.
Therefore, we can conclude that the overall generated description result is better than Acceptable
and close to Good.
4.2.5 Quantitative Analysis. In the end, besides the human evaluation, we further conduct a
quantitative study to investigate how well the generated description matches the ground truth
of the malware. Here, we define the 10 samples from the National Internet Emergency Center
as the CERT family. The ir of interpretability results across all malware samples generated by
XMal is shown in Fig. 8. We can see that the average ir of all malware samples is 0.80, while
the ir of four families (i.e., GinMaster, Kmin, MobileTx, and CERT) is greater than 0.9. The ir of
FakeInstaller and SMSreg families is lower than others, only 0.33 and 0.58 respectively. The reason is
that most samples in FakeInstaller and SMSreg malware families have no more than two malicious
behaviors, but XMal utilizes 6 key features to generate the malware description, resulting in a lot of
surplus_concepts in these two malware families. To summarize, XMal achieves good interpretability
results for all malware families except for FakeInstaller and SMSreg whose samples only have no
more than 2 malicious behaviours.
4.3 RQ3: Does XMal achieve a better interpretation than the state-of-the-art
techniques?
In this experiment, we aim to demonstrate that XMal can get a better interpretation than the state-
of-the-art techniques. To achieve this goal, we conduct experiments on XMal, Drebin and LIME
under the same data set, and compare their interpretation results through quantitative analysis and
case studies.
4.3.1 Setup. In this experiment, to demonstrate the interpreting effectiveness of our XMal, we
compare it with two state-of-the-art interpretable ML systems, Drebin [7] and LIME [53], on the
170 malicious samples selected and used in RQ2. The reasons we choose Drebin and LIME have
been mentioned in Section 4.1.2. For Drebin, we obtain the weight of features by acquiring the
coefficient of the liner SVM. The features with the highest weights are regarded as key features
and used to interpret the classification result. Similarly, we perform LIME on the MLP model to
obtain the feature weight of each test sample, and then select the feature with the highest weight
as the key feature and use it to explain why an app is classified as malware or benign app.
In order to compare the three methods, we first calculate all key features for all samples and
choose 6 key features in this comparison experiment. Note that the number of key features generated
by LIME is 6 by default. For fairness, the number of key features generated by Drebin is also set to
6. We then obtain the corresponding semantics of the key features based on the semantic database,
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which allows us to understand the connection between the key features and the ground truth.
Finally, we compare the interpretability of these three methods based on how well the key features
and semantics match the expert analysis, and discuss the performance of the three methods based
on the key features of the three malware families generated by them.
In addition, we compare the three methods from a quantitative perspective. We extract the
“concepts” from the semantics of key features, and compute the detect_concepts and surplus_concepts.
total_concepts can be extracted from the ground truth of malware samples. Then we respectively
calculate the ir of the interpretation results generated by the three methods and make a comparison.
Moreover, we compare the total number of key features across all these malware samples generated
by the Drebin, LIME, and XMal.
4.3.2 Results. We compare the three methods on the 170 malware samples, and demonstrate
the results of five representative malware (i.e., Adrd, GinMaster, MobileTx, blackgame, and xun-
baikew1), as shown in Table 8. For the sample in Adrd, XMal outputs the key features, among
which READ_PHONE_STATE, LocationManager.request and getSubscriberId match the behavior of
collecting confidential information (e.g., location and IMEI/IMSI), and the features, openConnection
and getResponseCode, match the behavior of sending information to remote location over the
internet, the remaining feature, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, matches the behavior of launch-
ing with system startup. By contrast, Drebin outputs the key features, among which getContent,
getDeviceId, and openConnection match the behavior of stealing information and sending it to a
remote location. However, the other features (i.e., Intent.action.MAIN, INSTALL_PACKAGES and
NotificationManager.cancel) do not match the key malicious behaviors. The key features generated
by LIME include openConnection, RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED and getDeviceId, which can
match the behavior of re-executing itself when the device is booted up and collecting information.
But the remaining key features, like INSTALL_PACKAGES and ContentResolver.delete cannot
match any behaviors of Adrd.
Similarly, for blackgame, xunbaikew1, and the samples in GinMaster and MobileTx, XMal
outputs key features that match the malicious behavior of the corresponding sample. However,
some of the key features generated by LIME and Drebin cannot match the behaviors of blackgame,
xunbaikew1, GinMaster and MobileTx, as shown in the bold features in Table 8. For the sample
in GinMaster, the key features generated by LIME can match most of the behavior of GinMaster,
but the remaining features (i.e., NotificationManager.notify and NotificationManager.cancel) do
not match any behaviors. For the sample in MobileTx, Drebin generates some key features that
match the malicious behavior of stealing information and sending SMS messages to a premium-rate
number, but the remaining features (e.g, Intent.action.MAIN and INSTALL_PACKAGES) do not
match any malicious behavior of MobileTx. Blackgame and xunbaikew1 have similar phenomena
with GinMaster and MobileTx.
For Drebin, the feature with maximum weight in Adrd, GinMaster, MobileTx, blackgame, and
xunbaikew1 is always Intent.action.MAIN, and some key features can not reveal any malicious
behaviors. The reasons are as follows. (1) Drebin utilizes the simple detection of linear SVM to
determine the contribution of each individual feature to the classification and the feature weight of
the model is only related to the model, but not to the test sample. If the features exist in test sample
and the features have a large weight in the model, they will be selected as key features. Therefore, it
makes sense that why Intent.action.MAIN is always the key feature and some key features generated
by Drebin can not reveal themalicious behaviors. For LIME, as we can see, the key features generated
by it do not match the behaviors of malware families very well. For example, LIME outputs the
feature with maximum weight, i.e., NotificationManager.notify and NotificationManager.cancel,
which do not match any malicious behaviors of GinMaster. The key features generated by LIME
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Table 8. Comparison of three approaches (i.e., Drebin, LIME, and XMal). The bold texts refer to key features
that cannot match the real malicious behavior. Ground Truth refers to the expert analysis corresponding to
each sample.
Ad
rd
Drebin LIME XMal
Key Features:
Intent.action.MAIN
INSTALL_PACKAGES
URL.getContent
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
URL.openConnection
NotificationManager.cancel
Corresponding Semantics:
1.None 2.Install packege
3.Get data from the Internet 4.Collect device ID
5.Access the Internet 6.Cancel notification
Key Features:
SEND_SMS
URL.openConnection
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
INSTALL_PACKAGES
ContentResolver.delete
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Send SMS message 2.Access the Internet
3.Activited by BOOT 4.Collect device ID(IMEI)
5.Install packege 6.Delete URI data
Key Features:
URL.openConnection
READ_PHONE_STATE
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
LocationManager.request
HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode
TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Access the Internet 2.Collect phone status
3.Activited by BOOT 4.Get updated location
5.Get Http response code 6.Collect SubscriberId ID(IMSI)
Ground Truth:1. Activate when the mobile device is booted up. 2. Access the Internet and download components. 3. Steal some info and send to remote server
Gi
nM
as
te
r
Drebin LIME XMal
Key Features:
Intent.action.MAIN
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
TelephonyManager.getSimSerialNumber
URL.openConnection
NotificationManager.cancel
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
Corresponding Semantics:
1.None 2.Collect device ID(IMEI)
3.Collect ICCID 4.Access the Internet
5.Cancel notification 6.Activited by BOOT
Key Features:
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
NotificationManager.notify
URL.openConnection
TelephonyManager.getSimSerialNumber
NotificationManager.cancel
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Activited by BOOT 2.Collect device ID(IMEI)
3.Post notification 4.Access the Internet
5.Collect ICCID 6.Cancel notification
Key Features:
URL.openConnection
READ_PHONE_STATE
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode
TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Access the Internet 2.Collect phone status
3.Activited by BOOT 4.Get Http response code
5.Collect SubscriberId ID(IMSI)
Ground Truth: 1. Steal info from the device. 2. Send info to remote server. 3. The malicious service is triggered when the device finishes a boot.
M
ob
ile
Tx
Drebin LIME XMal
Key Features:
Intent.action.MAIN
INSTALL_PACKAGES
URL.openConnection
RECEIVE_SMS
ActivityManager.restartPackage
SEND_SMS
Corresponding Semantics:
1.None 2.Install package
3.Get data from the Internet 4.collect SMS
5.Break other applications 6.Collect SMS
Key Features:
SEND_SMS
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
RECEIVE_SMS
INSTALL_PACKAGES
READ_SMS
ActivityManager.restartPackage
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Send SMS message 2.Collect device ID(IMEI)
3.Collect SMS 4.Install package
5.Collect SMS 6.Break other applications
Key Features:
SEND_SMS
URL.openConnection
READ_PHONE_STATE
TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId
HttpURLConnection.getResponseCode
Corresponding Semantics:
1.collect SMS 2.Access the Internet
3.Collect phone status 4.Collect SubscriberId ID(IMSI)
5.Get Http response code
Ground Truth: 1. Steal info from the compromised device. 2. Send SMS messages to premium-rate number.
bl
ac
kg
am
e
Drebin LIME XMal
Key Features:
Intent.action.MAIN
WifiManager.setWifiEnabled
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
TelephonyManager.getSimSerialNumber
URL.openConnection
NotificationManager.cancel
Corresponding Semantics:
1.None 2.Check whether wifi is enabled
3.Collect device ID(IMEI) 4.Collect ICCID
5.Access the Internet 6.Cancel notification
Key Features:
SmsManager.sendDataMessage
WifiManager.setWifiEnabled
RECEIVE_MMS
ContentResolver.delete
TelephonyManager.getNetworkOperatorName
elephonyManager.getDeviceId
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Send SMS message 2.Check whether wifi enabled
3.Collect MMS 5.Collect network operator name
4.Delete URI data 6.Collect device ID(IMEI)
Key Features:
URL.openConnection
SEND_SMS
RECEIVE_SMS
WRITE_SMS
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId
TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Access the Internet 2.Send SMS message
3.Collect SMS 4.Write SMS
5.collect device ID(IMEI) 6.collect SubscriberId ID(IMSI)
Ground Truth: 1. Send SMS message to premium-rate num. 2. Obtain phone num and device info and upload it to the remote server.
xu
nb
ai
ke
w
1
Drebin LIME XMal
Key Features:
Intent.action.MAIN
ContentResolver.query
SEND_SMS
Runtime.exec
READ_CONTACTS
PowerManager.newWakeLock
Corresponding Semantics:
1.None 2.Query URL data 3.Send SMS message
4.Execute command 5.Collect contacts
6.Keep processor and screen awake
Key Features:
SEND_SMS
ContentResolver.query
RECEIVE_SMS
INSTALL_PACKAGES
READ_SMS
ActivityManager.restartPackage
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Send SMS message 2.Query URL data
3.Collect SMS 4.Install package
5.Collect SMS 6.Break other applications
Key Features:
SEND_SMS
ContentResolver.query
READ_CONTACTS
Corresponding Semantics:
1.Send SMS message 2.Query URL data
3.Collect contacts
Ground Truth: Collect contact info, and then send SMS with the app download link to all contacts.
may not be accurate enough to give a reasonable explanation of the classification result in Android
malware detection. (2) LIME generates a linear model to approximate the local part of the original
complex model, which makes it difficult for LIME to accurately approximate the decision boundaries
near an instance, especially in malware detection applications. For XMal, it generates key features
that closely match the behaviors of the malware families.
We also conduct a quantitative analysis for the three methods. The ir of the interpretability
results across all these malware samples generated by Drebin, LIME and XMal is shown in Fig. 9.
XMal achieves the best interpretability results among the three methods across all these malware
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Fig. 9. The ir results across all malware samples generated by Drebin, LIME, and XMal
families. LIME is better than Drebin in most malware families except for Gappusin and MobileTx.
XMal obtains the largest average value of ir across all malicious families. The total number of the
key features across all malware samples generated by the three method is shown in Fig. 10. Specifi-
cally, (1) openConnection is a common key feature for all families generated by the three methods,
which indicates that most of malicious behaviors are based on Internet for these families. (2) Drebin
and LIME output the same common feature TelephonyManager.getDeviceId for all families. This
feature is used to get mobile information (e.g., IMEI). XMal outputs READ_PHONE_STATE with
the similar function as getDeviceId. (3) Similarly, SEND_SMS is another common key feature
for LIME and XMal, however, Drebin cannot identify SEDN_SMS for some malware families
such as BaseBridge and Kmin. Both of them contain the behavior of sending SMS. The feature
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED generated by LIME and XMal has the similar phenomenon with
SEND_SMS. (4) Drebin generates two other common key features (i.e., Intent.action.MAIN and
NotificationManager.cancel) for most families, but both of them cannot reveal malicious behav-
iors, as shown in Fig. 10 (green box). The similar phenomenon occurs on LIME for the feature
NotificationManager.notify, as shown in Fig. 10 (red box).
In summary, Drebin generated some key features that cannot reveal malicious behaviors such as
Intent.action.MAIN. LIME has a better performance in these families, but sometimes generates some
key features that are meaningless to interpret the malicious behaviors in concrete cases (shown
in Table 8). XMal generates key features for most malware families and is able to reveal the key
malicious behaviors within apps. Therefore, XMal achieves a better performance on interpretability
of Android malware detection.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the threats to validity, limitations of XMal and summarize open challenges
in the interpretability of Android malware detection according to our study.
5.1 Threats to validity
Conclusion validity. Since we use the collected ground truth to validate the malware descriptions
generated by our method, the results of XMal may differ if the ground truth is not accurate itself.
To ensure the accuracy of the ground truth, we collaborate with an experienced expert team from
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Fig. 10. Total number of key features across all malware samples generated by the Drebin, LIME, and XMal
National Internet Emergency Center and they manually analyze malware samples and provide the
analysis reports. We also collect the corresponding expert analysis reports of each family from
Symantec and Microsoft, and cross-validate the analysis reports from the two different resources
and obtain the final ground truth of malware descriptions.
Construct validity.We evaluate the generated results by manual comparison with the ground
truth, the results may be biased by our subjective opinions. In order to mitigate this issue, we
randomly select one sample from each malware family and conduct an online survey to investigate
the quality of the generated malware description for these samples.
Internal validity. The performance of classification models depends on the training set. If the
training set is small and not representative, the model cannot achieve a good generalization
ability. We collect 15,570 malicious samples, including all varieties of threats for Android, such
as data leakage, phishing, trojans, spyware, and root exploits. These malware samples are the
recent malicious samples rather than the old dataset such as Genome [75] in 2011. Moreover, the
performance of our method also depends on the hyperparameter configuration. It is important
to select a proper value for n. We perform hyperparameter tuning and explain the procedures in
Section 4.2.2.
External validity. Additionally, we simplify and generalize the functional descriptions into simple
semantics by intercepting and generalizing the key predicates, objects, and complements. Therefore,
semantics constitute is a threat to the external validity of the experiments. For reproducibility
purpose, we release the functional descriptions and the constructed semantics on our website https:
//sites.google.com/view/xmal/.
5.2 Limitations of XMal
We have proven the good performance of XMal in classification accuracy and interpretability, but
it still has some limitations as follows. A malware sample can contain several different malicious
behaviors. For example, a sample in the family, Geinimi, may collect information (e.g., IMEI, location,
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SMS messages, and contact) and upload them to a remote server, send SMS messages to a premium-
rate number, install or uninstall software and create a shortcut. XMal cannot output features
that match all the malicious behaviors in the sample, because it makes predictions by focusing
on the features with the highest weights (e.g., sending SMS messages to premium-rate number),
causing it to only notice the malicious behavior of a certain part. It may be possible to improve it
by using a multi-attention mechanism, which is our future work. To mitigate this issue, it may be
helpful to use multi-attention to focus on different parts of features or different types of features.
Multi-attention [37] utilizes a multi-modal deep learning method to learn various kinds of features,
and uses multiple attentions to focus on more features and behaviors in order to identify more
malicious behaviors.
The work in this paper is to explain why an app is classified as malware based on APIs and permis-
sions. Although these two features can effectively target malicious behaviors and explain the classi-
fication result, they are not enough to explain how the entire malicious behaviors are implemented.
More features should be taken into consideration. For example, If malware attempts to activate itself
when the mobile device is booted up, it first has to register an intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED
intent-filter and apply for the RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED permission in AndroidManifest.xml
file, and then wait to receive a RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent sent by the Android system
in order to launch with system startup. In this case, Intent is a key feature to explain how malicious
behaviors are implemented. Therefore, Intent should be taken into consideration in the analysis.
However, considering more features might also result in a decrease in interpretability. When we
obtain more key features, it might be more difficult to interpret the classification results. Therefore,
it is also an important task to select reasonable features and make a trade-off between the number
of features and interpretability performance.
Moreover, a small number of advanced malware try to hide their malicious behaviors by using
native and reflective calls [29]. Our method can only analyze the APIs that access native and
reflective calls to determine whether they are malicious. It is difficult to detect their malicious
behaviors when the malicious payloads are only introduced by native code. Although our method
did not use the native and reflective calls as features, nevertheless, it can still achieve a high detection
accuracy of 98.37%. Besides, native and reflective calls do not have the developer documentations
and a detailed functional description like permissions and APIs. As a result, we cannot construct
their semantics for interpretability purpose. We therefore do not take these features into account
in the feature set.
5.3 Open Challenges in Interpretability of Malware Detection
Many open challenges exist in explaining why an app is classified as malware. (1) One of them is a
complex scenario. Some dangerous APIs and permissions may be used in benign apps for good
purposes, such as the internal system apps. It is a great challenge for approaches that are based on
features to predict and interpret. Features that are used in different scenarios may have different
purposes. For example, in Section 4.1.3, two benign apps are misclassified as malware because they
have dangerous API calls and permissions and are considered to perform malicious behaviors. But
in fact, they are internal system apps, which own similar features and perform similar behaviors,
such as monitoring the phone status. (2) Another challenge is the malicious behaviors of current
malware become more complex. Malware may hide their behaviors through code obfuscation [42]
and evade malware detection by downloading the payload after installation. For example, samples
in fakeInstaller try to avoid analysis through code obfuscation and recompilation. The malware
author modifies its DEX file with an obfuscated version of the recompiled code and uses anti-reverse
techniques to avoid dynamic analysis and prevent malware from running in the emulator. Even
with manual analysis, it is difficult to fully understand all the malicious behaviors of some complex
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malware as we need to analyze more code, API calls, permissions, or other features to locate and
explain malicious behavior. However, it seems that the current interpretable machine learning
methods only use a small portion of features to explain the malicious behaviors. There is still a
long way to go to explain why an app is classified as malware for all malicious samples.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Machine Learning-based Android Malware Detection
Since the traditional malware detection methods cannot handle an increasing number of malicious
apps [13, 58], machine learning methods have become very popular and have achieved great success
in Android malware [6, 7, 16, 18, 19, 24, 28, 40, 52, 64, 70]. For example, Aafer et al. [6] proposed to
train a KNN classifier by learning relevant features extracted at API level and achieved accuracy
as high as 99% with a false positive rate as low as 2.2%. Yerima et al. [70] presented a method to
detect Android malware based on Bayesian Classification models obtained from API calls, system
commands and permissions. Wu et al. [64] adopted the k-nearest neighbour classification model
that leveraged the use of data-flow APIs as classification features to detect Android malware. Li et al.
[40] utilized three levels of pruning by mining the permission data to identify the most significant
permissions and trained an SVM classifier with 22 significant permissions. Other machine learning
algorithms such as SVM [7], Random forest [52], and XGboost [28] were also used to detect malware
and have proven to be effective.
With the popularity of deep neural networks, people began to utilize the deep neural network
models for malware detection [26, 37, 46, 67, 71]. Yu et al. [71] proposed to train a malware detection
model by using a representative machine learning technique, called ANN. McLaughlin et al. [46]
proposed a malware detection system that used a deep convolutional neural network to learn the
raw opcode sequence from a disassembled program. Kim et al. [37] utilized a multi-modal deep
learningmethod to learn various kinds of features in order to maximize the benefits of encompassing
multiple feature types. Xu et al. [67] used a Long Short Term Memory on the semantic structure of
Android bytecode and applied Multi-layer Perceptron on the XML files in order to identify malware
efficiently and effectively. All these method focused the malware detection accuracy rather than
the malware interpretability.
6.2 Machine Learning Interpretability
People would like to interpret the machine learning models through visualization and behavior
interpreting, which is what we are going to introduce.
6.2.1 Visualization. Visualization plays an important role in interpreting the machine learning
algorithm, especially dimensionality reduction, clustering, classification and regression analysis.
Elzen et al. [59] proposed a system that provided an intuitive visual representation of attribute
importance within different levels of the decision tree, helping users to gain a deeper understanding
of the decision tree result. Park et al. [51] utilized a simple graphical explanation to interpret the
naive Bayesian, linear support vector machine and logistic regression classification process, and
provided visualization of the classifier decisions and visualization of the evidence for these decisions.
Krause et al. [38] proposed to visualize the ranking information of predictive features to help
analysts understand how predictive features are being ranked across feature selection algorithms,
cross-validation folds, and classifiers. Visualization can be used to provide an intuitive visual way
to understand machine learning algorithms, but it is a better way to understand malware through
malicious behaviors. Therefore, in this paper, we try to interpret machine learning algorithms
through another way, behavior interpreting.
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6.2.2 Behavior Interpreting. In order to interpret machine learning models itself, it is crucial to
understand how they make predictions, which we define as behavior interpreting here. Through
behavior interpreting, we can understand the relation between the input elements and models’
output. To achieve this goal, many researchers have tried to combine the elements that have
the greatest impact on predictions to explain behaviors. In 2016, Ribeiro et al. [53] proposed a
model-agnostic method called LIME. It treated the model as a black-box and then generated a
linear model to approximate the local part of the model. The authors achieved this purpose by
minimizing the expected locally-aware loss. After that, the authors tried to interpret the machine
learning result through several features with the most weight. However, because LIME assumes
that features are independent, although LIME is designed for explaining the predictions of any
classifier, it actually supports CNN to work with image classifiers, but does not well support RNN
and MLP. For malware detection, features are interrelated, which makes it difficult for LIME to
accurately approximate the decision boundary near an instance. In 2018, Guo W et al. [35] proposed
LEMNA, a high-fidelity explanation method that solves the problem in LIME. LEMNA utilized
fused lasso, which acts as a penalty term that manifests as a constraint imposed upon coefficients
in loss functions, to handle the feature dependency problems. Then, it integrated fused lasso into a
mixture regression model to more accurately approximate locally nonlinear decision boundaries
to support complex deep learning decision. The mixture regression model is a combination of
multiple linear regression models. This method also interpreted the model through features with
the most weight and is more fidelity than other existing methods. However, there are inevitably
deviations due to the use of linear or simple models to approximate the original complex model.
Apart from the above work, some survey papers [34, 43] also conducted studies on interpretability.
All in all, they cannot interpret models’ output accurately in Android malware detection. To solve
this problem, we propose an interpretable machine learning model with a customized attention
mechanism.
6.3 Applications of Attention Mechanism
The attention mechanism is mainly applied to machine translation and computer vision. Bah-
danau et al. [10] first proposed to solve the problem of incapability of remembering long source
sentences in neural machine translation (NMT). Xu et al. [65] inspired by the attention mechanism
in machine translation, proposed an attention-based model that applied the attention mechanism
to images to automatically describe the content of images. They first use a convolutional neural net-
work to extract L feature vectors from the image, each of which is a D-dimensional representation
corresponding to a part of the image. Then they use an LSTM decoder to consume the convolution
features in order to produce descriptive words one by one, where the weights are learned through
attention. The decoder selectively focuses on certain parts of an image by weighting a subset of all
the feature vectors. The visualization of the attention weight can indicate the regions of the image
that the model pays attention to in order to output a certain word. In addition, it also allows us
to understand why some mistakes were made by the model. Vaswani et al. [60] proposed a new
simple network architecture, the Transformer, based solely on the attention mechanism to perform
machine translation tasks, and achieved good performance. There are many other applications
for attention mechanism, such as machine reading [20], video summarization [11] and document
classification [69]. Attention mechanism has been used to accomplish many machine learning tasks
and achieved great success. Therefore, we make the first attempt to apply it in malware detection
and interpret the classification results, but the traditional attention mechanism cannot be used
directly since its elements and targets are expressed in vector form. We customize the attention
mechanism through a fully connected network to learn the correlation between scalar-valued
feature elements and assign corresponding weights to the elements.
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7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach called XMal to interpret the malicious behaviors
of Android apps by leveraging a customized attention mechanism with the MLP model. XMal
achieved a high accuracy in Android malware detection, and output a reasonable natural language
description to interpret the malicious behaviors by leveraging the key features pinpointed by the
classification phase. Additionally, we compared XMal with LIME and Drebin, and demonstrated
that XMal obtained better performance in interpretability than the other two methods. Finally,
we presented an in-depth discussion to highlight the lessons learned and open-challenges in this
research field. The source code is released on the website https://github.com/wubozhi/Xmal.
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